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NATIONALISTIC TENDENCIES IN THE SLOVAK 
ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH1
by Frans Hoppenbrouwers 
 
Frans Hoppenbrouwers (*1962) is a Roman Catholic Church historian. 
He is secretary of studies of the Dutch Roman Catholic relief 
organisation Communicantes. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the eclipse of the communist regimes 
that followed it, nationalistic tendencies2 apparently revived throughout Central and 
Eastern Europe. Appearances can deceive and so they did. It is clear now that 
nationalistic thinking was fostered throughout the communist era. Even the state itself 
contributed to that. Nationalism finally became manifest in the 1980’s, during the 
Perestroika period. It preceded the 1989 turnover as well as the resurgence of a number 
of states that had lost their existence after World War II or even before that, e.g. the 
 
1 The author had talks with different representatives of the Roman-Catholic Church and politicians 
in Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia and the director of the Slovak ‘Council for Church-State Relations’ in 
July and October 1997. By means of e-mail, internet and fax new material was added. 
2 Though the expression nationalism is frequently used in this article it would be better to use the 
expression nationalistic tendencies, because nationalism is a generalising term. It comprises a varying 
configuration of characteristics that may differ in intensity: 1) A simplistic interpretation of history as the 
mischief and fortune of a national community struggling for the preservation of its specific identity (against 
suppression by envious or expansionist enemies). 2) At the same time this national community is claiming 
for itself the stature of the ultimate salvation of the individual community member. 3) Exaggerating 
national culture, virtues and moral values as a specific quality of the nation and at the same time 
(implicitly) emphasising the inferiority of others. 4) Forcing minority or non-dominant groups to adhere to 
the aforementioned values by ignoring or attacking alternative cultural expressions or by imposing 
restrictive legislation. 5) Evaluating the individual or collective choices in the political, cultural, moral or 
religious domain as directed against or favourable to the dominant national group. 
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Balkan states from 1990 until 1992, the Baltic states and Ukraine in 1991 and Belarus in 
1992. Last but not least, Slovakia gained independence on January 1,1993. 
 
Being the natural object of persecution, the Churches often proved to be 
strongholds of opposition. At the same time they held on to the national identity even if 
the national state had ceased to exist. In Slovakia the Roman Catholic Church played this 
particular role. Well organised the underground Church and the official Church – which 
were never separated – resisted the communist-atheist rule. Thus keeping faith alive the 
Slovak Roman Catholic Church became in the 1980’s an important opposition party 
organising mass pilgrimages to holy shrines on Slovak territory. The communist era 
worked as a kind of ideological freezer. As soon as the communists unexpectedly gave 
way and new possibilities for societal expansion became available, the pre-communist 
period served as a model of times to come. Other models just weren’t at hand. In the case 
of Slovakia rather unfortunately the Slovak State (1939-1945) became the point of 
reference, since Czechoslovakia itself was widely considered as a Czech-allied 
concoction of the Saint-Germain and Trianon peace conferences (1919/1920). This 
Slovak nostalgia centres on the Slovak State and more specifically its president, the 
Roman Catholic prelate Dr. Jozef Tiso (*1887-†1947). The wartime state is regarded by 
some Roman Catholics as an ideal society, where the Roman Catholic social doctrine 
prevailed, or as a time when Roman Catholic Church life flourished.3 Furthermore 
president Tiso had been executed by the Czech(oslovak) authorities as a fascist 
collaborator and had become in consequence an icon of anti-Czech sentiments and 
separatism. 
Given this specific context one can imagine that the relation of the Roman 
Catholic Church with past and present can be somewhat awkward  at times. Different 
themes will be investigated below: 
1. Church-state relations today. 
2. Slovak politics. 
 
3 E.g. A. Hlinka, 20 + 10 Jahre danach. Zur Lage der katholischen Kirche in der Slowakei, 
 
 3 
                                                                                                                                          
3. Recent Slovak history. 
4. Christianity and European history. Papal stimulus of Slovak nationalism? 
 
1. Church-State Relations Today 
 
Seewis-Uhldingen [1978], 16. 
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After 1989 the old communist structures of control and repression were 
abolished, also in the Federal Slovak Republic. At the ministry of culture only the 
department of church affairs with an economical and a juridical section remained. The 
establishment of a Council for Church-State Relations4 within the ministry on January 
1,1997 was therefore quite a remarkable event. Its main goals are: 1) To investigate and 
analyse the relations between Church and state. 2) To provide materials to governmental 
policy makers and individual researchers.5 Strangely enough the director that was 
appointed had – in old times – intermediate connections with the Czechoslovak secret 
service STB. A scientific advisory board supports the council. Its members represent the 
denominational diversity of Slovakia, but they are not official representatives of their 
respective Churches. They are selected by means of co-optation. Two of them are Roman 
Catholics, who returned from exile after the fall of the Berlin Wall. They are the 
professor of theology, vice-dean of the Bratislava seminary, Durica, and the sociologist-
priest Anton Hlinka. The latter wrote brochures and books on the oppression of the 
(Czecho-)Slovak Roman Catholic Church and used to be in Slovakia a very popular 
collaborator of Radio Free Europe. Hlinka is connected with other state institutions like 
the Slovak State Television (STV) and the second state university in Trnava.6 In the eyes 
of many Roman Catholics the council is a successor of the communist control structures. 
 
4 Ustav pre vztahy statu a cirkvi. 
5 P. Mulik, ‘Staat und Kirche in der Slowakei. Wertschätzung der Beziehungen zwischen Staat 
und Kirchen in der Slowakei’, [Bratislava (Institute for Church-State Relationships [of the Ministry of 
Culture]) 1997], 1-5. 
6 Presumably they feel themselves obliged or grateful to the new political leadership because of 
the newly gained independence. In other Eastern European countries emigrants from exile more often 
display radical viewpoints regarding nationalism and state loyalty. 
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The relations between the Roman Catholic Church – the most important dialogue 
partner in the religious domain7 – and the Slovak government is not unproblematic. The 
problems are mainly the result of the wheeling and dealing of the quasi-democrat 
Meciar-government, but the diverging attitudes of the Roman Catholic bishops towards 
the state also play their role. Furthermore the concordat policy of Rome is a complicating 
factor. Most bishops – many of them were priests of the underground Church and among 
them bishop Rudolf Balaz of Banska Bystrica, chairman of the Slovak bishops’ 
conference – do not want to co-operate with this government anymore, partly out of 
principle, partly out of mistrust. Archbishop Sokol of Trnava-Bratislava and primate of 
Slovakia, cardinal-bishop Korec of Nitra and the Greco-Catholic bishops of Kosice and 
Presov are more inclined to make compromises with the ruling Meciar government. 
 
Church-State Relations: the Slovak Independence (1993) 
Slovakia became independent on January 1, 1993 and especially in Czech 
ecclesiastical circles this was a traumatic event. Czech Church leaders had been strongly 
opposed to it. The mainstream Slovak Protestant Churches for instance had also been 
against independence. Being relatively small they were to suffer much from the division 
of Czechoslovakia. In the Czechoslovak Roman Catholic Church the opinions were 
divided. The then secretary of the Czech bishops’ conference, Thomas Halik, called 
“Roman Catholic nationalism or nationalistic Roman Catholicism” a “dangerous and 
perverse heresy”. He seemingly recognised nationalistic tendencies in the attitude of the 
Slovak bishops. Archbishop Vlk of Prague however thought it could free the Slovak 
Roman Catholics from feeling threatened or manipulated! He apparently supposed anti-
Czech sentiments or bias among the Slovak Roman Catholics. From the Czech side the 
 
7 About 65% of all Slovaks are baptised Roman Catholics (3.200.000). 
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Slovak bishops’ view of the independence was – as a Czech politician said – evaluated as 
naive, favourable or coward.8
 
8 J. Broun, ‘Church-state relations in Slovakia – October 1994’. In Religion in Eastern Europe (= 
RiEE) 15(1995)1, 14 and ‘Gegen katholischen Nationalismus’. In Glauben in der 2. Welt (= G2W) 
20(1992)9, 11. 
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Whatever their precise motives were, it is clear that the Slovak bishops lacked 
clarity. While Czech bishops called for a referendum (which in fact would have 
prevented the splitting up of Czechoslovakia),9 the Slovak bishops merely referred in the 
abstract to the right to self-determination as it is defined in the UN-charter. Bishop 
Tondra of Spis – then chairman of the Czechoslovak bishops’ conference – was 
personally in favour of the existing state structure, yet he also accentuated the right to 
self-determination.10 While the Roman Catholic bishops implicitly favoured 
independence the new premier of the Federal Slovak Republic Vladimir Meciar was 
trying to get them on his side (1992). To this purpose he made both threats and promises. 
Having beaten his Christian-democratic opponent, former prime minister Carnogursky, 
in the 1992 elections, he invited among others – like the Orthodox bishop Nikolaj of 
Presov and the Lutheran bishop-general Uhorskai – archbishop Sokol and cardinal-
bishop Korec. Meciar promised total religious freedom and called the Churches 
necessary agents of the state project for the moral revival of Slovakia. 
In a separate talk with the Roman Catholic Church leaders in June 1992 the prime 
minister expressed on the one hand his desire for good relationships with the Roman 
Catholic Church. On the other hand however Meciar admonished the bishops for 
supporting Carnogursky’s Christian-democrats. He underlined the need for a Christian-
democrat party, but at the same time he told his audience that Carnogursky’s party was 
not such a party. In the middle of November – the Slovak independence was announced 
on July 17, 1992 – premier Meciar visited the papal nuncio, bishop Coppa, in Prague to 
talk about politics, again. Meciar told him that the Roman Catholic Church should refrain 
from support to political parties in the future.11 Generally speaking the relations between 
the Roman Catholic Church and the Slovak government remained good until the second 
term of the Meciar cabinet (October 1994-September 1998), but then started to 
deteriorate (see below). In June 1993 President Kovac – still good friends with premier 
 
9 Opinion polls in Czechia and Slovakia showed that there was no majority in favour of the split. 
10 ‘Gegen katholischen Nationalismus’ and ‘Volksabstimmung gefordert’. In G2W 20(1992)9, 11 
and 20(1992)7/8, 13. 
11 ‘Neues Verhältnis zu den Kirchen’ and ‘Volksabstimmung gefordert’. In G2W 20(1992)12, 12 
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Meciar – even visited pope John Paul II in the Vatican. He thanked the pope for kissing 
the ground after arriving in Bratislava for his first visit to Slovakia (April 1990). Kovac 
saw it as an anticipated recognition of Slovak independence. The holy father called on 
him to let all Slovaks take up their responsibilities, minorities included.12
 
and 20(1992)7/8, 13. 
12 ‘President Kovac beim Papst’. In G2W 21(1993)7/8, 10. 
A New Concordat? 
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The concordat policy of the Holy See is a complicating factor in the Slovak 
situation that got a new impulse with the visit of archbishop Tauran – Rome’s foreign 
minister – in July 1997. The Slovak bishops received from him an instruction regarding 
the dialogue with the government. One of the issues at stake was to determine whether 
the University of the Holy Cyril and Methodius in Trnava could become a Roman 
Catholic university (see below). The exact timing of these negotiations was probably 
connected with the presidential and parliamentary elections (February and September 
1998).13 Given these elections one could have expected a more willing attitude on the 
side of the government. Three successive rounds of negotiations between Rome and 
Bratislava were foreseen and each round should have been concluded with the signing of 
a partial treaty. This method had already been tested in Croatia and Slovenia. The Roman 
Catholic Church was going to try to obtain as much freedom and support as possible in 
order to carry out its religious and social mission.14
On the part of the Slovak government the following problems needed to be 
solved: 
1. The financing of the Roman Catholic Church. The government wants to introduce a 
kind of Church tax similar to the system in some West-European countries (a fixed 
percentage of the income taxes). This mode of financing should become a part of the 
Slovak constitution. The Roman Catholic Church however wants to maintain the status 
quo: an annual donation according to present needs. 
 
13 The presidential elections ended in a stalemate, since no two third parliamentary majority could 
be found in favour of one of the candidates. 
14 The Croatian, Slovenian and Polish concordats can serve as examples. The Croatian-Vatican 
concordat in: ‘Conventio inter Sanctam Sedem et Croatiae Rem Republicam de iuridicialibus 
quaestionibus’. In Acta Apostolici Sedis 89(1997)277-302. 
2. The appointment of the bishops. According to the modus vivendi of 1927 the 
government has the right of approval after the nomination of a bishop by the Holy See. 
Since 1990 however the Vatican has appointed new bishops without consulting the 
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(Czecho-)Slovak government. “Thus – concluded the director of the Council for Church-
State Relations – anti-Slovak bishops have been appointed. This poses a threat to state 
security, because the new and small Slovak Republic needs an offensive patriotism, 
especially in the south where Slovaks are subject to hungarisation.” (It has been said that 
the Vatican would be prepared to make some concessions.) 
3. The restructuring of the borders of the Roman Catholic dioceses. The government 
apparently prefers new diocesan borders similar to those of the administrative regions, 
which split up the more or less homogenous Hungarian regions in the south of Slovakia. 
4. The interference of certain bishops with party politics. 
 
Talks started on July 19, 1997 in Trencianske Teplice in view of the first treaty 
on Roman Catholic education and pastoral care for the military and the police. Prime 
minister Meciar himself participated in the discussions, the Roman Catholic Church was 
represented by cardinal Korec among others and the Holy See by the papal nuncio to 
Slovakia, bishop Dosena. Bishop Balaz, chairman of the Slovak bishops’ conference, 
was absent. The negotiations between Church and state started under a bad sign. Just a 
few days before some pro-state newspapers had published a forged declaration of the 
bishops’ conference in which the Slovak bishops denied the present need for NATO.15 
The talks were short and inconclusive and premier Meciar said that both parties were to 
blame for the difficult discussions. The Roman Catholic representatives did not give any 
 
15 Most bishops on the contrary favour the entry of Slovakia into western supranational 
organisations. I. Chalupecky, ‘Die katholische Kirche in der Slowakei’. In Informationen und Berichte 
(1995)8/9, 4 gives another example of such forgery. In 1994 the HZDS orientated newspaper Slovenska 
Republika printed a faked declaration of priests of the Nitra diocese protesting against colleague priests in 
the Spis and Roznava dioceses, who had criticised the government. 
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comment.16 New discussions are not to be expected before the parliamentary elections in 
September 1998. 
 
 
 
 
16 T.A. Byrnes, ’Church and Nation in the Slovak Republic’. In Religion, State and Society (= 
RSTS) 25(1997)284 and A. Stiavnicky, ‘Kerk en regering in Slowakije’. In Bulletin kerkelijke contacten 
Tsjechië en Slowakije (= BKCTS) (1997)18, 9-10. 
2. Slovak Politics 
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The political climate in Slovakia is unhealthy.17 This is especially due to the 
politics of the HZDS party (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia) of the Machiavellian 
prime minister Vladimir Meciar. The leading members of the HZDS were recruited from 
the (former) state enterprises and among high government officials (apparat_iki). After 
the Iron Curtain was lifted they went into politics in order to secure themselves against a 
possible loss of power. Thus the privatisation of state enterprises was rather limited and 
mostly just beneficial to political friends. Another indicator of the bad political situation 
is the participation in the government of the SNS (Slovak National Party) and the left 
wing ZRS (Workers Union of Slovakia). The SNS party is more or less responsible for 
the nationalistic and sometimes xenophobic orientation of the educational and cultural 
policies. The history of the Slovak State (1939-1945) for example is now being 
(re)written. The minister of education Eva Slavkovska (SNS) has largely favoured the 
nationalistic cultural society Matica Slovenska that publicised heavily disputed books on 
the Slovak State of president Tiso. A positive evaluation of wartime Slovakia often 
results from a manifest anti-Hungarian and anti-Czech bias. 
 
17 A good overview in K.D. Martinsen, ‘Niedergang der slowakischen Demokratie’. In Osteuropa 
47(1997)791-809. See also http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/7502/human.html The Slovak Republic 
Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997, [Washington] (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights 
and Labor – U.S. Department of State) 1998. 
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Other health problems of the young Slovak democracy are the attempted state 
control over the mass media, restrictions on the non-governmental organisations 
(NGO’s) and the physical and mental intimidation of political opponents and critics of 
the Meciar government. In July 1995 for instance the residence of bishop Rudolf Balaz 
of Banska Bystrica was illegally searched by the Slovak secret service SIS in order to 
investigate (fictitious) accusations of art smuggling!18 A remarkable way of silencing the 
opposition is the foundation of new schools of higher education and faculties of 
university that have to compete with existing institutions. They receive more financial 
support and have teachers who display a remarkable degree of political correctness. In 
September 1997 in Trnava a second state university opened its doors. It was named the 
University of the Holy Cyril and Methodius. Thus the first, Christian-democrat orientated 
University of Trnava – under attack since 1994 – got a powerful competitor. Roman 
Catholic schools of higher education that had wanted incorporation into the University of 
Trnava received no state approval, but later were offered  incorporation into the 
University of the Holy Cyril and Methodius.19 Finally, in March 1998, the Slovak Roman 
Catholic Church leaders decided not to accept the government offer to turn the latter into 
a Roman Catholic university.20
 
The Roman Catholic Church in Opposition 
The relations between the Roman Catholic Church and the Slovak government 
were in the beginning rather good. In the Roman Catholic hierarchy were several bishops 
who favoured independence and cardinal-bishop Korec used to be an enthusiastic 
supporter of prime minister Meciar. Furthermore the Roman Catholic bishops had 
nothing much to complain about because the state left the Church well alone and was in 
fact supportive, providing state salaries for priests, generous restitution of confiscated 
church property (though problems were to arise) and subsidies for social, educational 
 
18 ‘Polizei durchsucht Bischofsamt’. In G2W 23(1995)10, 8. 
19 In consequence alumni only receive the lowest academic degree (magister) and will earn lower 
wages in state funded institutions. 
20 ‘Universitätsstreit’. In G2W 26(1998)6, 10. 
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and charitable activities. Meciar’s attitude was already authoritarian during his first time 
in office as premier (1992-1994), but it became even grimmer when he came in office the 
second time (October 1994).21
 
21 I. Chalupecky, ‘Die katholische Kirche in der Slowakei’, 1-7 gives a good overview of the early 
years of independence. 
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Already in December 1993 and again in May 1995, the bishop’s conference had 
complained about the situation of public life, especially the bad political culture 
characterised by politically motivated dismissals and the power struggle between 
president Kovac and premier Meciar. (This by the way incited a professor of the 
Bratislava archdiocesan seminary to criticise the Slovak bishops in the HZDS orientated 
newspaper Slovenska Republika.22) The language law of November 15, 1995 led to a 
more or less definitive split between government and bishops. This law aimed at the 
reduction of the presence of minority languages like Hungarian, thus favouring the use of 
Slovak language in public life. Protesting along with the Hungarian episcopate, the 
Slovak Roman Catholic bishops obtained the right to give pastoral care to the 
Hungarians in their own language. Later that same year the bishops came to the support 
of president Kovac against whom a fervent press campaign was raging. 
New protests followed when a new ‘law on the preservation of the republic’ was 
passed on March 26, 1996. It was more or less a copy of a communist law dating back to 
1948 and intended to silence the (Slovak-Hungarian) critics of the ruling government. In 
a public statement 10 of the 15 Roman Catholic bishops publicly condemned this law, 
cardinal Korec (who protested separately) and archbishop Sokol among others excepted. 
Bishop Balaz, chairman of the Roman Catholic bishops’ conference, saw it as a proof of 
the government’s lack of commitment to democracy and an open society. Soon after two 
priests – bishop Balaz supported one of them when criticised by archbishop Sokol – were 
charged under the new law. In December 1996 cardinal Korec protested against the 
unconstitutional exclusion of a former HZDS MP from parliament. In June 1997 
representatives of all major confessions, the Roman Catholic and Greco-Catholic Church 
included, visited president Kovac. The political culture was criticised and the political 
 
22 I. Chalupecky, ‘Die katholische Kirche in der Slowakei’, 5 does not mention which professor. 
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parties were called upon to deepen Slovak democracy and to strive for integration in 
European structures.23
 
23 T.A. Byrnes, ’Church and Nation in the Slovak Republic’, 285-286 and P. Morée, ‘Slowaakse 
bisschoppen protesteren tegen Meciar’. In BKCTS (07-1996)13, 3-4 and ‘Bischöfe für Kovac’, ‘Bischöfe 
gegen Republiksschutzgesetz’, ‘Kardinal Korec gegen Einschüchterung’, ‘Kirchenmänner beim 
Präsidenten’ and ‘Wider die politische Unkultur! Stellungname des Bischofskonferenz zur gesellschaftlich-
politischen Lage in der Slowakei’. In G2W 23(1995)6, 12, 24(1996)5, 9, 25(1997)1, 9-10, 25(1997)9, 10 
and 22(1994)1, 24-25. 
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Again in May 1998 only 9 bishops protested against the polarisation in the 
Slovak society creating an atmosphere of ethnic hatred, international isolation and the 
moral degradation of Slovakia. They called on the government to respect the resolutions 
of the Constitutional Court, to assure democratic elections, to let the Slovak people chose 
their president, to favour ethnic and religious tolerance and to guarantee objective 
information to the public by the media. The government parties condemned this protest 
as an illegitimate interference in state affairs. Premier Meciar told the 9 bishops to take 
an example in the pope , who allegedly had asked the Slovak bishops to leave politics 
alone. Furthermore he praised archbishop Sokol, cardinal Korec and the remaining 3 
bishops as responsible citizens.24
During the two visits to president Kovac in December 1993 and June 1997 the 
deterioration of moral and social life in Slovakia was also criticised. Poverty, drugs, 
economic decline, extreme differences of income were severely censured. The general 
lack of interest of the Slovak citizens in the political and societal life was denounced as 
the main reason of moral degeneration. Attending a funeral of a young gypsy, who was 
murdered by skinheads, bishop Balaz in July 1995 bravely condemned this act. He 
disapproved any kind of racism.25 Most residing Roman Catholic bishops were priests of 
the underground Church. They generally display a less favourable way of looking at the 
Slovak government than archbishop Sokol (apostolic-administrator under communist 
rule), cardinal-bishop Korec (an underground bishop) and the Greco-Catholic bishops. 
As a collective, individually and together with leaders of other Churches they have 
protested against political abuses and societal problems as well. 
 
3. Recent Slovak History 
 
24 ‘Geharnischte Kritik’. In G2W 26(1998)6, 9-10 and P. Morée, ‘Slowaakse bisschoppen klagen 
de regering-Meciar aan’. In BKCTS (06-1998)20, 3-4. 
25 See footnote 22. ‘Haltungsänderung gegenüber Zigeuner?’. In G2W 23(1995)11, 11. Gypsies 
generally have a bad reputation and are subject to ill treatment by citizens and state officials as well. 
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The revaluation of the political life of president Tiso (†1947), who was the first 
and only president of the Slovak State (1939-1945), is a recurring issue within and 
outside the Roman Catholic Church.26 This revaluation is closely connected to the 
Slovak State, which in fact was – as some argue – a de facto protectorate of the German 
Third Reich. Because Tiso was the president of the first independent Slovak political 
entity ever (where Roman Catholicism allegedly flourished), he has a big symbolic value 
to the present Slovak Republic. His role in the deportation of the Jews to the German 
death camps is the main issue at stake. Another issue alongside it is the repression of the 
Protestant Churches during the Tiso reign. How  far  Tiso’s responsibility did extend has 
in recent years become an open question once again. He is back on trial. 
 
The Roman Catholic Church and President Jozef Tiso 
During a meeting in New York in March 1992, cardinal-bishop Korec of Nitra 
complained  that in times of freedom it was still impossible to obtain the full truth about 
president Tiso. He expressed the wish for an unbiased historical investigation that would 
recognize attenuating circumstances since: 
“Tiso had no opportunity to prevent the Nazi’s from doing what they wanted to 
achieve in Slovakia.”27
The cardinal however had been criticised before by Hungarian Slovaks after inaugurating 
a Tiso memorial plaque.28 Other unfortunate events occurred. In the spring of 1993 in 
Ruzemberok bishop Tkac of Kosice spoke at a commemorative mass for the priest 
Andrej Hlinka (†1938), who had founded the Slovak National Party to which also Tiso 
belonged. He called upon his Czech brothers to apologise for executing president Tiso. 
Remarkable was the attendance of the vice-president of the Slovak National Council, 
 
26 E. Géze, ‘Der Schiksalsweg eines Priesters’. In Osteuropa 45(1995)A283-A287 
27 ‘Korec über Tiso’. G2W 20(1992)4, 9. 
28 R. Bohren, ‘Die Slowakei im Spiegel ihre (Kirchen-)Geschichte’. In G2W 22(1994)1, 18. 
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Jozef Prokes, who was then honorary president of the right-wing nationalist party SNS. 
He too called for a new appreciation of Tiso’s presidency.29
 
29 ‘Rehabilitierung gefordert’. In G2W 20(1993)9, 9. 
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In July 1997 historical research was still underway and no conclusions had been 
reached. This however could not prevent archbishop Sokol of Trnava-Bratislava from 
celebrating a mass to the memory of president Josef Tiso. This action was not 
uncontested within the Roman Catholic hierarchy. The chairman of the Slovak bishops’ 
conference bishop Rudolf Balaz of Banska Bystrica openly criticised archbishop Sokol.30 
This fortunately showed bishop Balaz’s shift of opinion, since on other occasions he also 
had spoken in favour of president Tiso. At the opening of a Jozef Tiso Memorial Hall, 
autumn 1996, he had called him an “extraordinary and outstanding personality”. Just a 
few months later he suggested that the judgement on wartime Slovakia and Tiso were 
biased exactly because the president was a Roman Catholic priest. (Thus covertly 
accusing critics of anti-clericalism.) For this reason he expressed the need for historical 
research.31
 
Ecumenical Complications 
 
30 ‘Slowaaks leerboek weerspiegelt dubbele houding over WO II’. In BKCTS (06-1997)6. 
31 T.A. Byrnes, ’Church and Nation in the Slovak Republic’, 286 and J. Luxmoore, ‘Eastern 
Europe 1994: a Review of Religious Life in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic 
and Poland’. In RSTS 23(1995)217. Luxmoore argues that Slovak bishops tried to temper nationalistic 
views on Tiso. 
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This attitude towards the history of the Slovak State is painful, especially for the 
Jewish community, but also for the Protestant Churches. Jews and Protestants alike now 
face a kind of Tiso revival characterised by the emergence of local ‘Society of Friends of 
President Tiso’ throughout the country, publications by the state supported nationalist 
cultural society Matica Slovenska, 32 Tiso memorials (1997), and the Roman Catholic 
desire for his rehabilitation. Furthermore, the oppression of the Protestant Churches 
during the Tiso reign and the contribution of its members in saving persecuted Jews is 
generally neglected.33 Nationalists negatively evaluate their participation (together with 
communists and Jews) in the Slovak National Uprising (August-October 1944), because 
it was directed against the Slovak State. The same goes for their working together in the 
National Council (1945-1946). Especially painful was the publication of the exile priest 
Milan S. Durica – a professor of sociology of the Padua University (Italy). His History of 
Slovakia and the Slovaks (1996), which was funded by the European Union and 
approved by the SNS led ministry of education, made a big – negative – impact. It was 
rightfully dismissed as anti-Czech, anti-Hungarian and anti-ecumenical, as insensitive 
towards the fate of the Slovak Jews and exonerating the Slovak wartime government,. 34 
Neglecting the essential contributions of Protestant intellectuals to the 19th century 
nationalist movement and the suffering of the Protestant Churches during the communist 
period, Durica in contrast highlighted the merits of the Roman Catholic Church. This 
however did not prevent a spokesman of archbishop Sokol to attach his approval to the 
already contested publication (July 1997). 
A positive development therefore was the decision of the Lutheran and Roman 
Catholic bishops to establish a reconciliatory committee that will investigate the historic 
relationships between Protestants and Roman Catholics. This committee was to focus on 
 
32 Other (extreme) right-wing organisations are the ‘Andrej Hlinka Society’ and the ‘Union of 
Slovak Soldiers’. These organisations support publications edited by the Matica Slovenska. 
33 ‘Christlich-jüdischer Dialog’ and ‘Warnung vor Faschismus’ In G2W 21(1993)4, 11 and 
23(1995)5, 9. 
34 M.S. Durica, Dejiny Slovenska a Slovakov, [Bratislava 1996]. A comprehensive analysis in 
English was provided by the Czech-Slovak review Kritika & Kontext 2(1997)2-3, 24-65. ‘Umstrittenes 
Geschichtsbuch’. In G2W 25(1997)6, 10. The Matica Slovenska published some of Durica’s books on Tiso. 
He’s to be distinguished from his brother mentioned in the text above. 
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the period from the Reformation until the first Slovak independence (1517-1939), the 
Churches in the Slovak State (1939-1945) and the Churches under communism (1945-
1989). In January 1998 six historians convened in order to start their activities. On April 
5 the Slovak bishops issued a declaration on the holocaust in the Roman Catholic weekly 
Katolicke Noviny. Referring to previous statements (1987 and 1990) they encouraged all 
people of good will to ask forgiveness and to overcome prejudices. The role of wartime 
president Tiso however wasn’t mentioned.35
 
President Josef Tiso: An Innocent Bystander? 
 
35 ‘Bischöfe zur Shoah’. In G2W 26(1998)5, 7-8 and ‘Versöhnungsinitiative’. In G2W 26(1998)3, 
8. 
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Proper research into the history of the Slovak State and especially into the life of 
president Tiso based on Slovak sources has not yet been undertaken. Nevertheless, by 
using German sources, one can still draw a raw picture of the attitude of the Slovak State 
towards the Jews and the way their deportation to the German death camps took place.36 
The image is not favourable. 
In October and November 1938 pogroms took place in Bratislava in which the 
Slovak fascist Hlinka-guards37 and German Slovaks took part. When independence 
(March 14, 1939) was declared Arianisation of Slovakia was well on the way. The 
Jewish Political Party (among others) had already been forbidden, Jewish property was 
confiscated and 6000 Jews in Bratislava were sent to labour camps. In the autumn of 
1941 a ‘Jewish codex’ was made law, stating who was a Jew and who was not. In 
November the Slovak government notified German authorities to be ready to send their 
Jewish population to the east, but at the same time lay a claim on their properties. In 
1942 registration and concentration proceeded and the Slovak government voluntarily 
offered the Germans 500 Reichmarks per Jew for the costs of deportation. Together with 
German deportation specialists – assistants of the infamous Adolf Eichmann – the 
Hlinka-guards and German militia rounded up 56,000 Jews that were sent to the death 
camps of Majdanek and Auschwitz. A number of Jews under ministerial and presidential 
protection remained, but after the Slovak National Uprising in 1944 until the end of 
March 1945, the remainder was sent to Auschwitz, Sachsenhausen and Theresienstadt. 
Again deportation experts and Slovak aids worked closely together. 
 
36 I’ve consulted Hans Safrian’s Eichmann and His Accomplices: H. Safrian, Eichmann und seine 
Gehilfe, Frankfurt am Main (Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag) 1995 [19931], 209-213 and 308-311. 
37 The Hlinka-guard was a paramilitary organisation established by the Slovak government in 
1938 to be ‘the moral auxiliary organs of all government offices’. See F. Vnuk, ‘Slovakia’s Six Eventful 
Months (October 1938-March 1939)’. In Slovak Studies 4: Historica 2, Cleveland-Rome (Slovak Institute) 
1964, 82. The nationalist Roman Catholic priest Frantisek Vnuk used to live in exile and is now professor 
of the Bratislava diocesan seminary. 
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One can ask now, if a new picture of Tiso will cast away the shadows that lay on 
his presidency. It has been argued that the higher necessity of survival as a state and the 
protection of the Slovak people led to the unwanted sacrifice of Jewish citizens.38 The 
level of co-operation and the profits gained from it however turn this questionable 
argument rather sour. Maybe the Slovak leadership was acting beyond freedom, but the 
creation of a context of permissiveness by outright anti-Semitism and active 
collaboration cannot be justified. Tiso’s role will remain ambiguous even if favourable 
evidence will be presented. A quotation from a conference held in Holi_ on August 8, 
1942 shows this clearly. When asking himself whether “the solution of the Jewish 
question” – as the Nazi’s used to call it – was compatible with Christian principles Tiso 
answered: 
“I think that no one has to be convinced of the fact that the Jewish element posed 
a threat to the life of the Slovak State. (…) We acted according to the law of 
God: Slovakia dispose of your enemies! In this sense we establish order and will 
continue to do so.”39
 
4. Christianity and European History. Papal Stimulus of Slovak Nationalism? 
Whenever travelling to Eastern Europe pope John Paul II always insists on the 
fundamental role Christianity played, plays and should play in the mental, spiritual and 
moral growth of the European states. The secular sphere and the religious sphere have 
interacted continuously resulting in the advancing impregnation of the secular sphere 
with Christian faith. Faith becomes firmly rooted in culture (inculturation). According to 
the pope the coming of age of Europe in the last 2000 years of history has a double 
meaning for the present: 
1. In view of the European integration each member state should recall and guard its own 
historic-Christian traditions in order to oppose the development of a vague European 
cultural relativism. 
 
38 E.g. M.s. Durica, ‘The Republic of Slovakia’. In Slovak Studies 1: Historica 1, Rome (Slovak 
Institute) 1961, 105-121. 
39 H. Safrian, Eichmann und seine Gehilfe, 213. 
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2. At the same time there exists the need for (re-)evangelisation, Tertio millennio 
adveniente.40 The gospel should continue to contribute to the public welfare (bonum 
commune). 
 
 
 
40 With the Coming of the 3rd millennium – the title of an apostolic letter of pope John Paul II 
(1994). 
Pope John Paul’s second visit to Slovakia (June 1995) 
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During his second visit to the Slovak Republic the holy father emphasised the 
Cyrilo-Methodian tradition as the linking pin of Christianity in Slovakia from the Greater 
Moravian Empire (9th and 10th c.) to the present.41 Here pope John Paul II touched a 
classic nationalist topic dear to the opponents of the Hungarian cultural oppression in the 
19th and 20th c. In this context the Slovak State (1939-1945) was considered as the 
revival of the Greater Moravian Empire. According to president Tiso the specific 
contribution of the two brothers Cyril and Methodius lay in their joining together of 
Christian faith and Slovak nation.42 The holy father however cleverly, but somewhat 
artificially avoided the linkage of the Greater Moravian Empire with the Slovak Republic 
(1993) through the Slovak State. He described the Second World War period as an 
interruption of the existence of the Czechoslovak Republic (1918-1939 and 1945-1992). 
Yet a clear, continuous line was drawn.43 (Papal interest in the Cyrilo-Methodian 
tradition dates back as far as pope Pius IX (†1878) and his successor Leo XIII (†1903). 
In 1981 John Paul II made the two holy brothers from Salonika in Greece, Cyril and 
Methodius, the patrons of Europe. They symbolise for him the re-evangelisation and the 
desired unification of Europe, geographically as well as mentally.44) 
Insisting on the analogy between the brothers-missionaries Cyril and Methodius 
and the Slovak bishops of today pope John Paul said: 
 
41 In fact the pope underlined that on the one hand the brothers Cyril (†869) and Methodius 
(†885) were the missionaries who brought orthodoxy to the Slavs and on the other hand professed their 
allegiance to the Holy See of Rome. See ‘The Holy Fathers Visit to the Slovak Republic’. In L’Osservatore 
Romano. Weekly Edition (= ORWE) (19-07-1995)10. 
42 J. Kirschbaum, ‘Cyrilo-Methodian Tradition in Slovak National and Political Life’. In Slovak 
Studies 3: Cyrillo-Methodiana, Rome (Slovak Institute) 1963, 153-172. 
43 ‘The Holy Father’s Visit to the Slovak Republic’. In ORWE (12-07-1995)11. 
44 K.j. Verleije, Brugfiguren voor een verdeeld Europa. Cyrillus en Methodius, Brugge 1982, 93-
152. 
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“In this delicate phase of the consolidation and growth of your country, a country 
which always found in Christian values a fundamental element of its identity, 
new and challenging tasks await the Church…’ 
Pope John Paul II meant the defence of the Roman Catholic faith and its believers 
against “…today’s enemies: radical subjectivism, practical materialism, religious 
indifference, consumerism, secularism and hedonism…” The Roman Catholic Church 
that once had resisted atheistic communism now has to fight new, western enemies.45 
According to the pope exactly here the Church should contribute to the public welfare by 
proclaiming the gospel. He does not reiterate or even support a political Roman 
Catholicism. 
During his visit to Slovakia the holy father recalled to his audience the witness of 
the martyrs in the history of Christianity up to the communist era. In Kosice on July 2 
John Paul II solemnly pronounced the canonisation of the so-called three ‘martyrs of 
Kosice’, who fell in 1619 under the hands of the Protestants. Already some months 
earlier though the intended canonisation was criticised by Protestant Church leaders. On 
the one hand, they opposed  the partial representation of historical facts. Protestants 
themselves had also been victim of religious intolerance. In Presov in 1687 the so-called 
‘24 martyrs of Presov’ were murdered by Roman Catholics. On the other hand, they were 
offended by the implicit comparison of the Protestants with the communist Church 
persecutors.46 Pope John Paul II proved to be sensitive to this criticism. In Presov and 
 
45 ‘The Holy Father’s Visit to the Slovak Republic’. In ORWE (12-07-1995)8. 
46 ‘Heiligsprechung in der Slowakei’ and ‘Martyrer von vorgestern’. In G2W 23(1995)3, 15. The 
canonisation of the 17th c. Roman Catholic priest Jan Sarkander in May 1995 in Czechia led to even 
stronger protests. A similar problem arose in 1993 when the Slovak bishops dedicated Slovakia to the 
Virgin Mary. The Protestant Church leaders had preferred a dedication of the Roman Catholic faithful to 
Mary instead. See ‘Ist Maria Patronin aller Slowaken’. In G2W 21(1993)11,9. 
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Kosice he commemorated the victims of Roman Catholic violence and stressed the 
common suffering during the communist era.47
 
47 ‘The Holy Father’s Visit to the Slovak Republic’. In ORWE (05-07-1995)1-2 and 3, (12-07-
1995)11 and (19-07-1995)9 and ‘Papstreise in die Slowakei’. In G2W 23(1995)7/8, 12. 
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Frankly speaking such canonisations should be avoided, because they stir up a 
tumultuous Church history, which until now has never been thoroughly investigated. It 
seems however that the need to promptly provide icons of persecution for the 1948-1989 
period leads to precipitated choices.48 Yet, one very positive feature could be 
distinguished. The new saints all had different, non-Slovak nationalities: Polish, Croatian 
and Hungarian. The pope made the following remark on that: 
“The three saints belonged to three different nations, but they shared the same 
faith (…). May their example renew in their fellow citizens of today a 
commitment to mutual understanding and may it strengthen especially between 
Slovaks and the Hungarian minority the bonds of friendship and co-operation!”49
Arriving in Bratislava on June 30 John Paul II had already expressed his satisfaction with 
the signing of the Slovak-Hungarian treaty regarding the Hungarian minority in 
Slovakia.50
At Sastin, the Marian pilgrimage site,  the holy father put forward the situation of 
the Czech, Rom and Hungarian minorities. Especially the Slovak-Hungarian Roman 
Catholics were brought to the attention of his audience.51 They had presented the pope a 
petition with some 52,000 signatures before his visit to Slovakia in protest against a lack 
of pastoral care. Points of concern were the absence of Hungarians in the higher Church 
hierarchy, the lack of Hungarian (speaking) priests and the restructuring of the Roman 
Catholic dioceses to the disadvantage of the Hungarian minority. Until then the bishop’s 
conference had refused to meet their demands, claiming that the Hungarian wishes were 
politically motivated, that vocations among Hungarians were lacking and that Slovak 
priest candidates learn Hungarian sufficiently well. John Paul II underlined this last 
point. He told his listeners that the Roman Catholic Church – because of its catholicity – 
 
48 Pope John Paul II has canonised more saints during his pontificate than the popes before him 
together the last five centuries. 
49 ‘The Holy Father’s Visit to the Slovak Republic’. In ORWE (05-07-1995)2. 
50 ‘The Holy Father’s Visit to the Slovak Republic’. In ORWE (05-07-1995)3. This treaty 
remained more or less without consequences. 
51 A similar protest was made before the pope’s first visit to Slovakia in 1990. Then the 
Hungarians asked for an auxiliary bishop of their own. 
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is committed to meet the minorities’ expectations. Moreover he said the Roman Catholic 
Church could not submit to any kind of nationalism.52
 
52 ‘Besorgte ungarische Katholiken’. In G2W 23(1995)2, 9, J. Broun, ‘Church-state relations in 
Slovakia – October 1994’, 15, T.A. Byrnes, ’Church and Nation in the Slovak Republic’, 286-288 and ‘The 
Holy Father’s Visit to the Slovak Republic’. In ORWE (12-07-1995)9. Examples of nationalistic Church 
policies are: diocesan structures in accordance to ethnic boundaries and the refusal to provide pastoral care 
in the native tongue. 
5. Conclusion 
After the unexpected changes in 1989 the Central and Eastern European countries 
had to develop new perspectives for the future. This was, and still is, a complicated 
process of trial and error, since the fear for an open and unknown future tends to favour a 
retreat into history (back to the future as they say). The openness towards the new, 
mostly western ways of life (e.g. democracy, pluralism, capitalism and liberalism) is 
often viewed with suspicion. In the case of the Slovak Roman Catholic Church – the 
Slovak Churches and society at large – there are some complicating factors. The period 
of the Czechoslovak Republic was perceived as being one of cultural and mental 
oppression (1920-1939). The communist era was the oppressive background to which the 
Roman Catholic Church (and other Churches) sometimes played an outstanding though 
minimised role (1948-1989). Therefore the first Slovak independence became a 
significant historic model (1939-1945). Then the Roman Catholic Church exercised a 
great influence upon moral, societal and political life. There Church figures like 
president Jozef Tiso played their prominent, yet contested role. 
Given the feeling of subordination that the Slovaks have felt and fostered towards 
the Czechs the Slovak independence was an almost ‘natural’ consequence of the fall of 
the Berlin Wall. (Czech politicians, like federal premier Klaus, on their part wanted to 
rid themselves of economically more backward Slovakia.) Ruled for centuries, mainly by 
Hungarians, the Slovaks were twice unwillingly incorporated into a Czechoslovak 
Republic. Support for independence from the side of the Slovak Roman Catholic Church 
came not as a surprise, because the Church itself and the Prague dominated communist 
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regime were antagonists. Moreover, the Slovak Roman Catholic Church bore the 
reminders of a time when it was an important institution. This memory not only brought 
with it an unfounded nostalgia – society was radically modernised in the 50 years under 
communism – but also a naive admiration of the past. Though it would be wrong to 
accuse the Slovak Roman Catholic Church of outright nationalism or even of anti-
Semitism, there are some examples of an unwarranted recycling of history. This 
indicates plain naiveté and a nationalistic way of thinking as well. 
The dependence of the Roman Catholic Church (and the Churches in general) on 
the state introduced an ambiguity in their mutual relations. On the one hand the state 
wanted to get Church support for their policies and was clearly willing to use persuasion 
as well as force. On the other hand the Church had to adapt to the new laws, mentalities 
and outlook of the Slovak government. A certain, minimal loyalty was required in order 
to be or to become a serious negotiation partner. (Here is another possible reason, why 
the Slovak bishops did not strongly oppose the independence of Slovakia.) The 
developments after the independence of January 1, 1993 however made it quite 
impossible for the Church not to protest. Thus the Church leaders got trapped in a 
discourse that qualifies stances as pro- or anti-Slovak. Pro-Hungarian support, just like 
criticising state policies, is interpreted as anti-Slovak. Protesting against certain laws, 
which aim at the Hungarian minority, does not imply however a non-nationalistic way of 
thinking. The desired rehabilitation of president Tiso, the definition of a new diocesan 
circumscription or the unwillingness to provide a Slovak-Hungarian auxiliary bishop 
show it clearly. Nevertheless it is difficult to tell exactly whether the Church policies 
result purely from pragmatic choices (adaptation), a kind of exaggerated pro-Slovak 
point of view (nationalism) or defiance of state interference with the internal Roman 
Catholic church affairs (protest). All three elements seem to be there. 
Further European unification has induced regionalism and a renewed interest and 
concern for the national cultural heritage. In the young Slovak Republic this concern is 
much bigger, since the perception of the national history is mainly one of loss. Moreover 
small countries will most likely play a minor role in the western supranational 
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organisations. In this given context pope John Paul’s back to the roots can have a 
negative influence on the integration into these organisations and – binding faith and 
nation firmly together – give an impulse to nationalistic ways of thinking. It could lead to 
the usurpation of history as wholly Roman Catholic, thus identifying Roman Catholicism 
and the Slovak nation and denying historic and present (religious) pluralism. This 
happened with the canonisation of the three Counterreformation saints. Most Slovak 
bishops however favour integration into western military, economical and political 
structures. 
The great importance that is attached to the inculturation of the Christian tradition 
(in its Roman Catholic denominational variety) could result in involuntarily facilitating 
the linkage of theological or religious themes with nationalistic-historic ones. Of course, 
the Cyrilo-Methodian tradition is much broader than Slovak Roman Catholicism (Cyril 
and Methodius brought Orthodox Christianity to the Slavs), but in fact this specific 
tradition in reality can have other significations: a. Slovak Roman Catholicism, b. faith 
and Slovak nation, c. Orthodoxy, d. European unification along with (re-)evangelisation. 
The many different meanings make these themes vulnerable and vague at the same time. 
Though intending one interpretation, another, nationalistic one can be perceived. In the 
case of Slovakia the Cyrilo-Methodian tradition most likely refers to an imagined 
continuous historic development from the Greater Moravian Empire, where the Slovak 
people allegedly played a leading role, to the present days. This history of the Slovak 
people includes the Roman Catholic, fascist Slovak State of 1939-1945. 
Because the communist utopia has been abandoned and the western, liberal 
utopia is being criticised without emphasising its blessings the nationalistic paradise 
lost-utopia can become a seductive and therefore dangerous alternative for the Roman 
Catholic Church in Central and Eastern Europe. This is partly due to the tradition 
orientated approach of the Roman Catholic teachings. Most Slovak Roman Catholic 
Church leaders however bravely condemned the nationalistic inspired government 
legislation, the political climate in general, nationalism and anti-Semitism. Initial naiveté 
and allegiance to the newly independent Slovakia gave way to serious criticism. In May 
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1998 the majority of the bishops explicitly condemned nationalistic (ethnic) intolerance. 
Some individual bishops and Roman Catholic intellectuals however have clearly 
demonstrated their nationalistic way of thinking. The history of the Slovak State (1939-
1945) and its president Jozef Tiso remain controversial issues. The Roman Catholic 
bishops for one reason or another stay loyal to the wartime president, who seems to have 
a special attraction to them. 
